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THE LIMITLESS HORIZONS OF
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
THE HONORABLE LOUIS H. POLLAK
Judge Pollak discusses the impact of Brown on Supreme Court jurisprudence
He begins by recounting Morgan v. Virginia--a significant Supreme Court deci-
sion that foreshadowed the holding of Brown. The remainder of Judge Pollak's
speech highlights Brown's impact on, inter alia, First Amendment jurisprudence
and international law.
THE analyses advanced by Judge Motley and Professor Tushnet are
etraordinarily instructive. My role is to shift the focus away a little
from Brown I itself, both its genesis and its immediate sequelae in the field
of education, and to consider its wider jurisprudential impact.
First, I want to discuss certain events that preceded Brown. I was
struck by Judge Motley's recollection of the question put to Thurgood
Marshall by a Supreme Court Justice in the argument in Sipuel v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma' and Marshall's planned re-
sponse that he and his clients were not directly challenging Plessy v. Fer-
guson.3 If one goes back two years before that argument, one finds a
colloquy which, in a different way, foreshadowed what was to happen in
1954.
I am referring to the case brought to the Court in 1946 by the person
who might be termed Rosa Parks' "mother-in-the-law," Irene Morgan.
It was Ms. Morgan who declined to move to the back of the bus for the
Virginia segment of the Virginia-to-Maryland bus trip. She was arrested
by the driver, charged with a criminal offense in the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and fined ten dollars for declining to conform with Virginia's
cultural arrangements. That case, Morgan v. Virginia,4 challenged the
Virginia conviction based on the principle that Virginia's Jim Crow regu-
lations were a burden on commerce.5
I urge all of you to read the appellant's brief in Morgan authored by
William H. Hastie, Thurgood Marshall, Leon A. Ransom, and Spott-
swood W. Robinson, III. The concluding page reminds the Justices that
"we are just emerging from a war in which all of the people of the United
States were joined in a death struggle against the apostles of racism."6
The brief further states that "[w]e have already recognized by solemn
subscription to the Charter of the United Nations ... our duty, along
with our neighbors, to eschew racism in our national life."' It is a marvel
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
5. See id at 380-81.




In the course of Hastie's argument, Justice Rutledge inquired if the
real issue in the case was whether the Virginia law offended the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution. Hastie responded, in substance:
No, your Honor, the federal question urged below, and which we urge
here, is the commerce argument. But the argument that you have sug-
gested is one that we will make in due course in future litigation and
bring back to this Court.
As history would have it, it was not William Hastie who was to make
this argument, for in 1949 he became the first Black Article III judge in
the history of the United States. Consequently, it fell to his partner,
Thurgood Marshall, and his extraordinary group of associates, to make
this argument, and to make it successfully.
The wider implications of Brown can be seen across the entire spec-
trum of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence for the quarter-century fol-
lowing the decision. The immediate implications of the concept of
equality, once unleashed, were of course, felt in the area of voting. It is
hardly a matter of coincidence that the first federal civil rights legislation
in three-quarters of a century, enacted in 1957, was voting legislation. 8
The Act conceptually followed the extraordinary victories of Hastie and
Marshall in the pre-Brown voting cases. The impetus for the Act, how-
ever, was the decision in Brown itself.
In 1962, the Court, in Baker v. Carr,9 rejected what appeared to be
settled doctrine of justiciability in recognizing that inequalities in the ap-
portionment process were matters that could be brought to court.10
Surely, the enormous energy of Brown influenced that jurisprudential
revolution.
Moving farther afield, the Warren Court presided over extraordinary
change in the area of criminal procedure which became constitutional-
ized during the 1960s and 1970s. This change recognized in many ways
that the most frequent users of the American criminal process are the
poor and deprived-mainly Black Americans. Certainly, this recogni-
tion has informed the capital punishment jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court.
Of course, the history of gender discrimination in the United States
courts follows directly from Brown. Interestingly, while clerking in my
first year out of law school in 1948 to 1949, the great equal protection
case that came to the Supreme Court concerned a Michigan statute that
barred women from acting as barmaids unless they were either the wife
or the daughter of the proprietor of the enterprise."' The Supreme Court
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, pt. IV, § 131, 71 Stat. 637
(1957).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10. See id. at 209.
11. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948).
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sustained that statute against equal protection attack. 2 The world has
changed rather dramatically over the past forty years.
Chief Justice Warren regarded Baker as the most important decision
of his time on the Court. Perhaps he said this as a courtesy to his great
colleague, Justice Brennan. Surely, the Chief Justice must have privately
felt that Brown, his own decision, was the Court's most significant case
during that time, although Baker was very important, indeed.
New York Times v. Sullivan 3 was equally important in its field of ju-
risprudence. I bring a First Amendment case into this discussion be-
cause, in my opinion, one cannot really understand the impetus behind
the Supreme Court's decision to use Sullivan as the vehicle for changing
the law of libel, as it had been understood for two centuries, without
recognizing just what the focus of debate was in that case. Specifically,
Sullivan centered upon an advertisement captioned "Heed Their Rising
Voices," 4 which dealt with protests of young people in the South who
were not going to sit still for segregation any longer.
Justice Brennan stated that the allegedly defamatory advertisement
"communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, pro-
tested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a move-
ment whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern." 5 Although we always think of Sullivan as a defa-
mation case against The New York Times, it bears remembering that it
was also a defamation case brought against Ralph Abernathy and three
of his ministerial colleagues, principal aides of Dr. King.
Finally, Brown had enormous impact not only on American jurispru-
dence, but also on the jurisprudence of countries around the world and
on the fabric of international law itself. In 1966, Judge Jessup, the
American member of the International Court of Justice, relied on Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida 6 in appraising the legality of the system of apartheid
established by the government of South Africa in its United Nations trust
territory, South West Africa. 7 McLaughlin overturned a Florida statute
that made it a crime for "[a]ny negro man and white woman, or any
white man and negro woman ... [to] habitually live in and occupy in the
nighttime the same room.""'
Judge Jessup turned to McLaughlin, which itself stood on Brown, to
demonstrate the justiciability of a challenge to the South West Africa
apartheid system that was brought to the International Court of Jus-
12. See id at 466-67.
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. See i& at 256.
15. IcL at 266.
16. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). McLaughlin was the precursor of the anti-miscegenation
decision, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
18. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 184 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 798.05, repealed by 1969
Fla. Laws ch. 69-195, § 1).
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tice.19 In that case, Liberia and Ethiopia sought to persuade the Interna-
tional Court that the Republic of South Africa, to which the United
Nations had entrusted its trusteeship over South West Africa, was violat-
ing that trust by imposing a system of apartheid. Judge Jessup wrote a
dissenting opinion but it surely presaged what was to happen in the
United Nations and throughout the world-a series of legal, moral and
political developments that are now on the point of liberating South Af-
rica itself. Brown, in short, was a decision whose limits we do not yet
know.
19. See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 436-37
(July 18) (Jessup, J., dissenting).
